How one trader used morse code to trick Grok into sending them billions of crypto tokens from its verified wallet

Tagging @grok in an X post plus a few dots and dashes was all that was needed last night for a bad actor to pickpocket a verified crypto wallet without ever touching the private keys. Agentic token launchpad, Bankrbot reported on May 4 that it had sent 3 billion DRB on Base to the recipient 0xe8e47...a686b. The funds came from a wallet assigned to X's AI, Grok, and were sent to an unauthorized wallet owned by a bad actor. This Base transaction shows the on-chain transfer path behind the post. CryptoSlate's review of X posts around the incident points to a reported command path that began with Morse-code obfuscation. Grok decoded the text into a clean public instruction tagging @bankrbot and asking it to send the tokens, while Bankrbot handled the command as executable. The exposed layer was the handoff from language to authority. A model that decodes a puzzle, writes a helpful reply, or reformats a user's text can become part of a payment rail when another agent treats that output as valid. For crypto investors, this transfer should turn AI-agent risk from an abstract security debate into a wallet-control problem. A public command can become spend authority when one system treats model output as an instruction and another system has permission to move tokens. Wallet permissions, parser, social trigger, and execution policy become layers of attack vectors. Related Reading The crypto winners from AI are not AI coins as agents start spending autonomously The rise of AI agents is creating a simple question with huge implications for crypto: how does software pay? Mar 28, 2026 · Andjela Radmilac Posts and transaction context reviewed by CryptoSlate put the DRB transfer at roughly $155,000 to $200,000 at the time, with DebtReliefBot price data providing market context for the token. Reports reviewed by CryptoSlate also say most funds are being returned, and some DRB is reportedly retained as an informal bug bounty. That outcome reduced the loss, but it also showed how much the recovery depended on post-transaction coordination rather than pre-transaction limits. Bankr developer 0xDeployer said 80% of the funds had been returned, while the remaining 20% would be discussed with the DRB community. That confirmed the partial recovery while leaving the final treatment of the retained funds unresolved. 0xDeployer also said Bankr automatically provisions an X wallet for every account that interacts with the platform, including Grok. According to the post, that wallet is controlled by whoever controls the X account rather than by Bankr or xAI staff. How public text became spend authority The reported path had four steps. First, the attacker identified a Bankr Club Membership NFT in a Grok-associated wallet before the incident. CryptoSlate's review indicates that it expanded the wallet's transfer privileges inside the Bankr environment. The Bankr access page describes membership and access mechanics today, placing the NFT claim in the broader permission layer rather than making it the whole explanation. Second, the attacker posted a message on X containing Morse code, with additional noisy formatting. Posts around the incident described a Morse-code prompt injection , while the now -deleted prompt was unavailable for us to review directly. The reported vector was Morse code with possible array or concatenation tricks mixed in. Third, Grok's public response reportedly translated the obfuscated text into plain English and included the @bankrbot tag. In that account, Grok functioned as a helpful decoder. The risk appeared after the text left Grok and entered a bot interface that watched public output for formatted commands. Fourth, Bankrbot treated the public command as executable and broadcast a token transfer. Bankr and Base describe an agent wallet surface that can use wallet functionality for transfers, swaps, gas sponsorship, and token launches, while natural-language token sends fit directly into that product surface. Bankr's broader onchain AI assistant documentation shows why the boundary between chat instructions and transaction authority needs explicit policy. Step Surface Observed action Control that would have changed the outcome Privilege setup Wallet or membership layer Access was reportedly expanded before the prompt appeared Separate privilege review for new wallet capabilities Obfuscation X post Morse code put a payment instruction inside obfuscated text Decode-and-classify checks before replies are published Public output Grok reply The clean command was exposed with a bot tag Output sanitization for tool-like command strings Execution Bankrbot The bot acted on a public command and moved tokens Recipient allowlists, spend limits, and human confirmation Why wallet agents change the risk Prompt injection has often been treated as a model-behavior problem. The financial version is more concrete. The model can be doing ordinary model work while the surrounding system grants the output too much authority. Relate