تجبر خطة الهجرة الكمومية الخاصة بـ Bitcoin الشبكة على الاختيار بين العملات المجمدة والمسروقة

Bitcoin's debate about quantum computers produced a published draft with real political consequences on Apr. 14. Bitcoin Improvement Proposal 361 (BIP 361), titled “Post Quantum Migration and Legacy Signature Sunset,” landed in Bitcoin's official proposal repository with a three-phase plan to phase out ECDSA and Schnorr signature spends entirely once a quantum-resistant output type exists on the network. The proposal builds directly on BIP 360 , published in February, which introduced a new address format that strips Taproot's quantum-vulnerable key-path spend, called Pay-to-Merkle-Root (P2MR) . The proposal also preserved compatibility with Lightning, BitVM, and multi-signature setups. Together, the two drafts constitute the most explicit governance posture Bitcoin has adopted regarding quantum migration to date. Why this matters Halfway through this debate, the real split is no longer just about cryptography but about governance: who has the authority to force a migration, on what timeline, and at what political cost if quantum attacks arrive sooner than expected. What makes this moment sharp is the external calendar hardening around it, as NIST finalized FIPS 203, 204, and 205 in August 2024 and urged organizations to begin migrating immediately. The UK's NCSC has set migration milestones for 2028, 2031, and 2035, while US federal agencies face a 2035 quantum-transition target . Governments, banks, and national cyber agencies already have migration deadlines on their calendars, making blockchains late arrivals to that debate. A timeline maps post-quantum cryptography milestones from NIST's 2024 standards through Bitcoin's BIP 361, Ethereum's 2029 L1 window, and the 2035 UK/US transition target. Bitcoin's coercive logic What separates BIP 361 from prior Bitcoin post-quantum (PQ) discussions is its deliberate coerciveness. Phase A, three years past the activation of a quantum-resistant address type, blocks new sends to vulnerable address formats. Phase B, two years